Security of quantum key distribution using d-level systems by Cerf, Nicolas J. et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
01
07
13
0v
1 
 2
6 
Ju
l 2
00
1
Security of quantum key distribution using d-level systems
Nicolas J. Cerf,1,2 Mohamed Bourennane,3 Anders Karlsson,3 and Nicolas Gisin4
1 Ecole Polytechnique, CP 165, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium
2 Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91109
3 Department of Microelectronics and Information Technology, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH),
Electrum 229, SE-164 40 Kista, Sweden
4 GAP-Optique, Universite´ de Gene`ve, 20 rue de l’Ecole de Me´decine, Gene`ve 4, Switzerland
(July 2001)
We consider two quantum cryptographic schemes relying on encoding the key into qudits, i.e.
quantum states in a d-dimensional Hilbert space. The first cryptosystem uses two mutually unbiased
bases (thereby extending the BB84 scheme), while the second exploits all the d + 1 available such
bases (extending the six-state protocol for qubits). We derive the information gained by a potential
eavesdropper applying a cloning-based individual attack, along with an upper bound on the error
rate that ensures unconditional security against coherent attacks.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.+c
Quantum key distribution is probably one of the most
promising concepts in quantum information theory, and
has been extensively studied both theoretically and ex-
perimentally since its discovery by Bennett and Brassard
in 1984 [1]. This cryptographic method allows two re-
mote parties to share a secret key by use of a quantum
channel supplemented with a public authenticated clas-
sical channel (see e.g. [2] for a review). The impossibility
for an eavesdropper to tap the quantum channel with-
out disturbing the communicated quantum data – in a
way that can, in principle, be detected using the classi-
cal channel – ensures the security of the key distribution.
Most of the research effort to date has focused on quan-
tum cryptosystems based on two-dimensional quantum
variables (qubits) carried e.g. by the polarization state
of individual photons. In particular, the optimal individ-
ual attack is now known both for the BB84 protocol (us-
ing two mutually unbiased bases [3]) and for the six-state
protocol (using all three maximally unbiased bases [4,5]).
Strong bounds have also been derived in the more general
case of coherent attacks, which are useful to assess the
security of quantum cryptography (see e.g. [6–8]). For
higher-dimensional systems, however, very few results
have been obtained on the resistance to eavesdropping
of qudit-based schemes (i.e., schemes based on encoding
the key on d-level systems). The only schemes that have
been considered use either two bases for a ququat (4-level
system) [9] or four bases for a qutrit [10], but their se-
curity was only investigated against simple non-optimal
attacks.
In this Letter, we investigate more general quantum
cryptosystems where the encoding is made into qudits
with arbitrary d, extending on an earlier study by some
of us that only considered simple individual attacks [11].
A first protocol we study consists in using two mutu-
ally unbiased bases, just as in the original BB84 scheme.
The sender Alice sends a basis state in one of these two
bases chosen at random, while the receiver Bob makes a
measurement in one of these two bases, again at random.
The basis used by each party is subsequently disclosed on
the public channel, so that Alice and Bob obtain corre-
lated d-ary random variables if they used the same bases
(and if there was no disturbance on the channel), which
happens with probability 1/2. The use of mutually unbi-
ased (or complementary) bases implies that if Alice and
Bob use different bases, Bob’s measurement yields a ran-
dom number that is uncorrelated with Alice’s state. The
raw secret key is then made out of the correlated data
(discarding the uncorrelated data is known as the sifting
procedure). This procedures ensures that any attempt
by an eavesdropper Eve (oblivious of the chosen basis)
to gain information on Alice’s state induces errors in the
transmission, which can then be detected by the legiti-
mate parties. The second qudit-based protocol that we
study makes use of all the d+1 mutually unbiased bases
that are available in a d-dimensional Hilbert space, much
in the same way as the six-state protocol for qubits. Here,
Alice and Bob choose their basis at random among the
d+1 possible bases. This method clearly has a lower yield
than the first one since the sifting procedure only keeps
one transmission out of d+1 (instead of 1/2). However, as
we shall see, this second protocol is more secure against
individual attacks in the sense that a slightly higher error
rate is acceptable.
In what follows, we will analyze the security of these
two cryptographic protocols against individual attacks
(where the qudits are monitored separately) as well as
coherent attacks (where several qudits are monitored
jointly). For the individual case, we consider a fairly
general class of eavesdropping attacks that are based on
quantum cloning machines. It is known for qubits that
such a cloning-based attack simply is the optimal eaves-
dropping strategy, that is, the best Eve can do is to clone
(imperfectly) Alice’s qubit and keep a copy while send-
ing the original to Bob. An appropriate measurement of
the clone (and the ancilla system) after disclosure of the
basis enables Eve to gain the maximum possible infor-
mation on Alice’s key bit. Extending this cloning-based
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individual attack to higher dimensions results in a lower
bound on the information accessible to Eve for a given er-
ror rate. Hence, this yields an upper bound on the error
rate, which is a necessary condition for security against
individual attacks. (Higher error rates do not permit
to establish a secret key using one-way communication.)
We conjecture that applying the optimal cloner is actu-
ally the best strategy for Eve in any dimension, so that
this bound is actually tight. For the case of coherent at-
tacks, we consider a situation where Eve interacts with a
qudit sequence of arbitrary (but finite) length, and then
uses the basis information to extract key information.
In particular, we make use of an information-theoretic
uncertainty principle to derive a lower bound on Bob’s
information, or, equivalently, an upper bound on the er-
ror rate. It is a sufficient condition for the protocol to
be guaranteed to generate a nonzero net key rate for all
attacks.
Let us consider first an individual eavesdropping based
on the use of a quantum cloning machine for qudits. The
particular cloning machine that is best using depends on
whether the protocol uses two bases or d + 1 bases. We
focus on the case of two bases first, for which we need
to use a cloner that copies equally well two mutually un-
biased bases, e.g. the computational basis {|k〉}, with
k = 0, · · · , d− 1, and its dual under a Fourier transform
|l〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
e2pii(kl/d)|k〉 (1)
with l = 0, · · · , d − 1. We use a general class of cloning
transformations as defined in [12]. If Alice sends the state
|ψ〉, the transformation reads
|ψ〉A →
d−1∑
m,n=0
am,n Um,n|ψ〉B |Bm,−n〉E,E′ (2)
where A, B, E, and E′ stand for Alice’s qudit, Bob’s
clone, Eve’s clone and cloning machine, respectively.
Here, the amplitudes am,n (with
∑d−1
m,n=0 |am,n|2 = 1)
characterize the cloner, while the states |Bm,n〉EE′ are d-
dimensional Bell states, that is, a set of d2 orthonormal
maximally-entangled states of two qudits,
|Bm,n〉EE′ = 1√
d
N−1∑
k=0
e2pii(kn/d)|k〉E |k +m〉E′ (3)
with m,n = 0, · · · , d − 1. Note that the kets must be
taken modulo d here. The operators Um,n defined as
Um,n =
d−1∑
k=0
e2pii(kn/d)|k +m〉〈k| (4)
form a group of qudit error operators, generalizing the
Pauli matrices for qubits: m labels the shift errors (ex-
tending the bit flip σx) while n labels the phase errors
(extending the phase flip σz). Tracing the output joint
state given by Eq. (2) over EE′ implies that Alice’s state
|ψ〉A is transformed, at Bob’s station, into the mixture
ρB =
d−1∑
m,n=0
|am,n|2 Um,n|ψ〉〈ψ|U †m,n (5)
Thus, the state undergoes a Um,n error with probabil-
ity |am,n|2. Note that U0,0 = 1 , implying that the state
is left unchanged with probability |a0,0|2. If Alice sends
any state |k〉 in the computational basis, the phase errors
(n 6= 0) clearly do not play any role in the above mixture
since Um,n|k〉 = e2pii(kn/d)|k +m〉, so Bob’s fidelity can
be expressed as
F = 〈k|ρB|k〉 =
d−1∑
n=0
|a0,n|2 (6)
In the complementary basis, we have Um,n|l〉 =
e−2pii(l+n)m/d |l+ n〉, so the shift errors (m 6= 0) do not
play any role and Bob’s fidelity becomes
F = 〈l|ρB|l〉 =
d−1∑
m=0
|am,0|2 (7)
For the cloner to copy equally well the states of both
bases, we choose a d× d amplitude matrix of the form
a =


v x · · · x
x y · · · y
...
...
. . .
...
x y · · · y

 (8)
with x, y, and v being real variables satisfying the nor-
malization condition v2 + 2(d − 1)x2 + (d − 1)2y2 = 1.
Thus, Bob’s fidelity is F = v2 + (d− 1)x2 in both bases,
and the corresponding mutual information between Al-
ice and Bob (if the latter measures his clone in the good
basis) is given by
IAB = log2 d+F log2 F +(1−F ) log2
(
1− F
d− 1
)
(9)
since the d− 1 possible errors are equiprobable.
Now, the clone kept by Eve can be shown to be in a
state given by an expression similar to Eq. (5) but with
the amplitudes am,n replaced by
bm,n =
1
d
d−1∑
m′,n′=0
e2pii(nm
′−mn′)/d am′,n′ (10)
that is, the Fourier transform of the am,n’s [12]. This
corresponds to a matrix similar to Eq. (8) but with
x → x′ = [v + (d− 2)x+ (1 − d)y]/d
y → y′ = (v − 2x+ y)/d
v → v′ = [v + 2(d− 1)x+ (d− 1)2y]/d (11)
resulting in a cloning fidelity for Eve given by FE =
v′2+(d− 1)x′2. Maximizing Eve’s fidelity FE for a given
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value of Bob’s fidelity F (using the normalization rela-
tion) yields the optimal cloner:
x =
√
F (1− F )
d− 1 , y =
1− F
d− 1 , v = F (12)
The corresponding optimal fidelity for Eve is
FE =
F
d
+
(d− 1)(1− F )
d
+
2
d
√
(d− 1)F (1− F ) (13)
Let us see how Eve can maximize her information on Al-
ice’s state. If Alice sends the state |k〉, then it is clear
from Eq. (2) that Eve can obtain Bob’s errorm simply by
performing a partial Bell measurement (measuring only
them index) on EE′. Then, it appears from Eqs. (8) and
(12) that, in order to infer Alice’s state, Eve must dis-
tinguish between d non-orthogonal states (corresponding
to all possible values of k) with a same scalar product
(dF − 1)/(d − 1) for all pairs of states, regardless the
measured value of m. Consequently, Eve’s information
IAE is simply given by the same expression as Eq. (9)
but replacing F by FE . As a result, Bob’s and Eve’s
information curves intersect exactly where the fidelities
coincide, that is, at
F = FE =
1
2
(
1 +
1√
d
)
(14)
We now use a theorem due to Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [13],
which provides a lower bound on the secret key rate, that
is, the rate R at which Alice and Bob can generate se-
cret key bits via privacy amplification: if Alice, Bob and
Eve share many independent realizations of a probabil-
ity distribution p(a, b, e), then there exists a protocol that
generates a number of key bits per realization satisfying
R ≥ max(IAB − IAE , IAB − IBE) (15)
It is therefore sufficient that IAB > IAE in order to
establish a secret key with a non-zero rate. If we re-
strict ourselves to one-way communication on the clas-
sical channel, this actually is also a necessary condition.
Consequently, the quantum cryptographic protocol above
ceases to generate secret key bits precisely at the point
where Eve’s information attains Bob’s information. In
Table I, we have computed the disturbance D = 1 − F
(or error rate) at which IAB = IAE (or F = FE), that is,
above which Alice and Bob cannot distill a secret key any
more by use of one-way privacy amplification protocols.
Strictly speaking, since we only conjectured here that the
cloning-based attack is optimal for all d, Dind2 is actually
an upper bound on D that must necessarily be satisfied
to generate secret key bits with one-way protocols. (A
tighter upper bound on D might exist if the optimal in-
dividual attack was not cloning, but we conjecture this
is not the case). Interestingly, we note that D increases
with the dimension d, suggesting that a cryptosystem
based on qudits is more secure for large d.
Now, we consider the second protocol where all d + 1
bases are used. The cloner that must be used then is
an asymmetric universal cloner [12], characterized by an
amplitude matrix of the same form as (8) but with x = y,
the normalization relation becoming v2+(d2− 1)x2 = 1.
Here, Bob’s fidelity is given by F = v2 + (d − 1)x2 =
1− d(d− 1)x2, so that the cloner is characterized by
x2 =
1− F
d(d− 1) , v
2 =
(d+ 1)F − 1
d
(16)
As before, Bob’s information is given by Eq. (9). Eve’s
clone is characterized by a matrix of the same form, with
x → x′ = (v − x)/d
v → v′ = [v + (d2 − 1)x]/d (17)
so the corresponding fidelity is FE = v
′2 + (d − 1)x′2 =
1− d(d− 1)x′2. For deriving Eve’s information, we need
first to rewrite the cloning transformation as
|k〉A → v − x√
d
|k〉B
d−1∑
l=0
|l〉E |l〉E′
+x
√
d
d−1∑
m=0
|k +m〉B|k〉E |k +m〉E′ (18)
After the basis is disclosed, Eve’s strategy is first to mea-
sure both E and E′, the difference (modulo d) of the
outcomes simply giving Bob’s error m. Making use of
v − x = x′d and expressing x and x′ as functions of F
and FE , it is easy to check that the best Eve can do then
is to use the state of her clone E as an estimate of Alice’s
state |k〉. If Bob makes no error (m = 0), which hap-
pens with probability F , then it yields the correct value
of k with probability (F +FE − 1)/F , while it yields any
other of the d − 1 possibilities l 6= k with probability
(1 − FE)/[(d − 1)F ]. In contrast, if Bob makes an error
(m 6= 0), then Eve obtains the right k with probability
one. Consequently, the average mutual information be-
tween Alice and Eve conditionally on Bob’s error m can
be written as
IAE = log2 d+ (F + FE − 1) log2
(
F + FE − 1
F
)
+(1− FE) log2
(
1− FE
(d− 1)F
)
(19)
One can check that, for a given F , IAE is slightly lower
here than for the 2-bases protocol, which is consistent
with the stronger requirement that we put on the cloner.
Therefore, the fidelity F at which IAB = IAE is slightly
lower, and the corresponding disturbance D = 1 − F
is slightly higher. In Table I, we have shown the cor-
responding upper bound Dindd+1 for several values of d,
illustrating that there is a slight advantage in using all
d+ 1 bases, as for the 6-state protocol for qubits [4,5].
Our last result concerns the most general eavesdrop-
ping strategy which consists in applying a coherent at-
tack on a sequence of qudits of arbitrary (but finite) size
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n. Actually, our reasoning is simpler to state with a sin-
gle qudit, but it remains valid for qudit sequences. We
use an uncertainty principle due to Hall [14] that puts a
limit on the sum of Bob’s and Eve’s information: if Bˆ
and Eˆ are Bob’s and Eve’s observables applied on the
qudit sent by Alice, then
IAB + IAE ≤ 2 log2
(
d max
i,j
|〈bi|ej〉|
)
(20)
where |bi〉 and |ej〉 are the eigenstates of Bˆ and Eˆ, respec-
tively. Since Eve has no way of guessing the basis used by
Alice, her optimal information is the same for the correct
and incorrect bases. Thus, one can bound IAE by assum-
ing that Eve measures an observable Eˆ complementary
to Bˆ (i.e. |〈bi|ej〉| = d−1/2, ∀i, j) [2]:
IAB + IAE ≤ log2(d) (21)
Using the discussion following Eq. (15), we conclude that
IAB > log2(d)/2 is a sufficient condition to warrant se-
curity against coherent attacks if the key is made out
of a large number of independent realizations of n-qudit
sequences (i.e., if the key is much longer than n). Us-
ing Eq. (9), this translates into a lower bound on F , or,
equivalently, an upper bound on D
F log2
(
1
F
)
+ (1− F ) log2
(
d− 1
1− F
)
<
log2 d
2
(22)
which guarantees that one can distill secret key bits. This
bound for coherent attacks, shown in Table I, exactly co-
incides with the well-known 11% bound on the error rate
for d = 2 due to Mayers [6].
In summary, we have extended standard quantum
cryptography to protocols where the key is carried by
quantum states in a space of arbitrary dimension d. We
have used a general model of quantum cloning [12] in
order to calculate the information accessible to an eaves-
dropper monitoring the qudits individually. This pro-
vides an upper bound on the error rate above which the
legitimate parties cannot distill a secret key by use of one-
way privacy amplification protocols (since IAB < IAE).
We conjectured that this bound is tight (i.e., applying
the optimal cloner is the best strategy for Eve to gain
the maximum information). Our analysis also suggested
that the 2-bases protocol should be preferred to a (d+1)-
bases one since its maximum acceptable error rate is only
slightly lower, while the corresponding secret key rate is
much larger. Finally, we have derived a very simple se-
curity proof of quantum cryptography with qudits that
exploits an intuitive information inequality constraining
the simultaneous measurement of conjugate observables
[14]. This results in an upper bound on the acceptable
error rate that is more restrictive than the previous one,
but guarantees that a non-zero secret key rate can always
be produced (even with coherent attacks on sequences of
finite length). In the region between these two bounds,
it is unknown whether the security is guaranteed or not.
It should be stressed that all the bounds on D discussed
above tend to 1/2 for d → ∞, reflecting the advantage
of using higher-dimensional spaces. However, practical
limitations might be more severe in realistic qudit-based
cryptosystems, in particular the influence of the detec-
tor’s quantum efficiency and dark count rate. This is
discussed in a related paper [15].
Note: After completion of this work, it was proven in
an independent paper [16] that the optimal individual
attack for qutrits (d = 3) when using all four mutually
unbiased bases exactly coincides with our results based
on the optimal cloning machine, as conjectured here.
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d D
ind
2 (%) D
ind
d+1 (%) D
coh (%)
2 14.64 15.64 11.00
3 21.13 22.67 15.95
4 25 26.66 18.93
5 27.64 29.23 20.99
10 34.19 34.97 26.21
TABLE I. Disturbance D = 1−F (or error rate) as a func-
tion of the dimension d. The columns Dind2 and D
ind
d+1 display
the values of D at which IAB = IAE for a cloning-based in-
dividual attack with the 2-bases or (d + 1)-bases protocol,
respectively. The last column Dcoh corresponds to an upper
bound onD that guarantees security against coherent attacks.
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